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I. Introduction
In the summer of 2007, mortgage foreclosure rates were increasing in
nearly all metropolitan areas.' By the end of 2008, the foreclosure crisis had
spread to suburban areas as well.2 Foreclosures in the United States are at
an all time high,3 and the number of foreclosed properties will likely in-
crease as the recession's impact continues.4
While foreclosure negatively impacts individual owners and surrounding
neighbors,' it often also results in the involuntary displacement of tenants.
1. Dan Immergluck, The Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosed Properties, and Federal Policy,
75 J. Am. PLANNING ASs'N 406, 408 (2009).
2. Id. at 410.
3. 155 CONG. REc. E1257-04 (daily ed. May 19,2009) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
4. There are two predominant methods of foreclosure: judicial foreclosure, in
which, upon default on the mortgage by the mortgagor, the mortgagee sues the
mortgagor and there is a sale of the property in a court action in equity; and power
of sale foreclosure, in which, upon default on the mortgage by the mortgagor, the
property is sold at a public sale after the mortgagee satisfies state notice require-
ments. GRANr S. NELSON ET AL., REAL EsTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT
614-15, 641 (8th ed. 2009).
5. Immergluck, supra note 1, at 409 ("In addition to causing financial and social
hardship to individuals and households, high foreclosure rates can have negative
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The foreclosure crisis impacts a great number of tenants in part because of
the "substantial rise in investor-owned borrowing after 2002."6 In 2007, over
4,800 foreclosures in Chicago were filed on two-to-six unit buildings, which
are typically occupied by tenants.' In comparison, there were approximately
7,300 filings on one-unit properties, which are often owner-occupied.8 More-
over, these foreclosures on the two- to six-unit buildings represent many
more than just 4,800 households.9 In fact, "renters displaced by foreclosures
[likely] exceeded owners in 2007 in Chicago.""o Similarly in New York City,
an increase in foreclosure filings in 2008 affecting multi-family dwellings
with five or more units impacted 16,000 renter households." The numbers
increased in the first quarter of 2009, as 4,500 rental households in multi-
family dwellings with five or more units were affected by foreclosure fil-
ings.12 While it is difficult to say with certainty how many rental households
the foreclosure crisis has affected, estimates indicate "nearly twenty percent
of foreclosures involve" one- to four-unit, tenant-occupied properties.13
One potential consequence of this tenant displacement is homeless-
ness.14 Due to "little notice and scant savings," low-income tenants are
susceptible to becoming homeless.15 Displaced tenants are also at risk of
homelessness due to the fact that tenants are generally younger and have
lower incomes than homeowners.16 Low-income households, in turn, have
effects on neighborhoods and localities, especially when they are geographically
concentrated.") (internal citations omited).
6. DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND THE UN-
DERMINING OF AMERICA'S MORTGAGE MARKET 154 (2009). "Many rental units are owned
and operated by individuals with limited resources and so are quite susceptible to





11. Vicki Been, Professor of Law and Director of Furman Center for Real Es-
tate and Urban Policy at New York University, Renters and Foreclosure: Testimony
Before the New York City Council Committee on Housing & Buildings (Apr. 21,
2009) (transcript available at http://furmancenter.org/files/testimonies/Been
Testimony_.CityCouncilForeclosureHearing-42109.pdf).
12. Id.
13. JoINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIv., AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING THE
KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 14 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.
edu/publications/rental/rh08-americasrentalhousing/rhO8_americas-rental_
housing.pdf.
14. Peter S. Goodman, Foreclosures Force Ex-Homeowners to Turn to Shelters, N.Y
TIMEs, Oct. 18, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/business/
economy/ 19foreclosed.html.
15. Id.
16. NAT'L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, ET AL., FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SuiPRIME CRISIS 8 (2009), available at http://www.national
homeless.org/advocacy/ForeclosuretoHomelessness06O9.pdf.
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the greatest housing cost burdens. 7 These cost burdens, coupled with a
lack of affordable housing, increase the risk of homelessness for displaced
tenants. 8 As stated by the White House Press Secretary, "[o]ne of the often
overlooked problems of the foreclosure crisis has been the eviction of rent-
ers in good standing, through no fault of their own, from properties in
foreclosure.""
In response to these "often overlooked problems," on May 20, 2009,
Congress passed the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 200920 (PTFA)
as Title VII of the Helping Families Save their Homes Act of 2009.21 PTFA
requires existing leases to be honored when a property is foreclosed.2 In
the event that the tenant does not have a lease or the lease is terminable
at will, the tenant is entitled to 90 days' notice to vacate.2 This article will
examine PTFA and its effect on state law in various jurisdictions. Part II
analyzes three aspects of PTFA: (1) what PTFA accomplishes; (2) vagueness
within PTFA; and (3) issues that PTFA does not address. The second part
of the article will consider how PTFA impacts state law in six jurisdictions:
Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington, D.C.24
II. Analysis of PTFA
The Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 has two major parts.'
The first part addresses the effect of foreclosure on preexisting tenancies,2 6
while the second part addresses the effect of foreclosure on Section 8 tenan-
cies.27 This article will limit its analysis to the first section, examining PTFA
and its impact on existing state law regarding tenants' rights at foreclo-
sure.28 This analysis is broken into three sections. The first section examines
the nature of PTFA. The second section analyzes vagueness within PTFA.
The final section discusses issues on which PTFA is silent.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Press Release, White House Office of Commc'ns, Pres. Obama Signs the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act, May 20, 2009, 2009 WL 1398465.
20. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, Pub. L. 111-22, § 701, 123 Stat. 1632
(2009) (hereinafter, PTFA).
21. Id. § 1(b).
22. Id. § 702.
23. Id.
24. These jurisdictions were selected because they represent jurisdictions in
which judicial foreclosure is the dominant method of foreclosure as well as those in
which power of sale foreclosure is the dominant method of foreclosure.
25. PTFA, supra note 20, §§ 702, 703.
26. Id. § 702.
27. Id. § 703.
28. It should be noted that PTFA is only effective for a limited period of time; all
protections under PTFA terminate on December 12, 2012. Id. § 704.
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A. The Nature of PTFA and What It Addresses
PTFA addresses the rights of tenants of a foreclosed property. To do so,
PTFA outlines the steps a successor in interest to a foreclosed property must
take in order to vacate a preexisting tenant.29 PTFA also addresses proper-
ties subject to PTFA and parties that are eligible for PTFA's protection.3
PTFA states that successors in interest to certain foreclosed properties
assume interest in such properties subject to the rights of certain tenants.3'
If the tenant has a lease, the successor in interest assumes his interest in the
property "subject to ... the end of the remaining term of the lease."32 If the
successor in interest sells the property to a purchaser who "will occupy
the unit as a primary residence," however, he may terminate the lease pro-
vided that the tenant receives 90 days' notice.33 If the tenant does not have
a lease or has a lease "terminable at will under state law," the successor in
interest assumes his interest subject to the tenant's right to receive a 90-day
notice to vacate from the successor in interest.3
PTFA includes an exceptions clause to ensure that tenants receive the
greatest protection from foreclosure possible under the law. PTFA states
that "nothing under this section shall affect the requirements for termina-
tion of any Federal- or State-subsidized tenancy or of any State or local
law that provides longer time periods or other additional protections for
tenants."3 5 With this exceptions clause, PTFA only preempts state law re-
garding the rights of preexisting tenants and successors in interest after
foreclosure if state law provides less protection to tenants than PTFA.3 The
exceptions clause requires analysis of applicable law within a particular
jurisdiction in order to determine the rights of preexisting tenants of fore-
closed property.
PTFA provides tenants with more rights than they normally have at
foreclosure. Typically, a foreclosure terminates a tenant's ability to oc-
cupy a property; 7 foreclosure extinguishes the rights of a tenant whose
interest in a property is junior to that of the mortgage being foreclosed."
PTFA changes this standard and establishes a national baseline rule; under
PTFA, a tenant's right to occupy a property is not terminated after a fore-
29. Id. § 702(a).
30. Id. § 702(a)-(b).
31. Id. § 702(a).
32. Id. § 702(a)(2)(A).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 702(a)(2)(B).
35. Id. § 702(a).
36. See discussion infra Part III.
37. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSUREs: DEFENSES, WooUTS & MORTGAGE
SERVICING § 14.8 (2d ed. 2007).
38. Id.
closure. Instead, PTFA requires successors in interest to give preexisting
tenants, regardless of whether their interest in the property is junior or se-
nior to the mortgage, at least 90 days to vacate the property.39
Only certain properties fall within PTFA's purview. PTFA applies to the
foreclosure of: (1) a federally related mortgage loan, or (2) any dwelling or
residential real property.' A federally related mortgage loan "includes any
loan (other than temporary financing .. .) [that] is secured by a first or sub-
ordinate lien on residential real property ... designed principally for the
occupancy of from one to four families," and is either: (1) "made in whole
or in part by a lender insured [by the Federal Government]"; or (2) "made
in whole or in part, or insured, guaranteed, or supplemented or assisted in
any way by the Secretary or any other officer or agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment or under or in connection with a housing program administered
[by the Federal Government]"; or (3) is intended to be sold by the origina-
tor to Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae.41 Because PTFA encompasses the foreclo-
sures of all federally related mortgage loans and all dwellings or residential
property, only business properties with mortgage loans not guaranteed by
the federal government are excluded from PTFA's protection.
PTFA states that it protects only bona fide tenants and persons with bona
fide leases. A lease or tenancy is defined as bona fide if:
(1) the mortgagor or the child, spouse, or parent of the mortgagor under
the contract is not the tenant; (2) the lease or tenancy was the result of an
arms-length transaction; and (3) the lease or tenancy requires the receipt
of rent that is not substantially less than fair market rent for the property
or the unit's rent is reduced or subsidized due to Federal, State, or local
subsidy.'
The elements required to establish a bona fide lease or tenancy preclude
defaulting mortgagors from obtaining protection under PTFA.43
B. Vagueness Within PTFA
While PTFA gives certain preexisting tenants rights at the foreclosures
of certain properties, PTFA contains vagueness that creates problems in
its application. PTFA is vague as to the rights and responsibilities of suc-
cessors in interest after foreclosure. PTFA states that a successor in interest
takes the property "subject to ... the end of the remaining term of the lease,"'
39. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702(a). A tenant may have longer than 90 days if the
tenant has a lease for a term of years and the successor in interest has no interest in
using the property as a personal residence. Id.
40. Id.
41. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1).
42. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702(b).
43. See id.
44. Id. § 702(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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rather than pursuant to the terms of the lease. The language is thus unclear
as to whether the successor in interest is bound to the covenants that the
landlord (the defaulting mortgagor) entered into with the tenant prior to
foreclosure.
Narrowly construed, the phrase "subject to the end of the remaining
term of the lease" may be interpreted to only bind the successor in interest
to one covenant of the lease agreement, its duration. Under this construc-
tion, a successor in interest would not be held to any other lease covenants,
which may harm tenants; if the other covenants of the lease are not hon-
ored, tenants no longer receive the benefit of their original bargain with
the landlord.45 Conversely, a broad construction of the phrase would bind
the successor in interest to all covenants originally entered into by the de-
faulting mortgagor, with the successor in interest stepping into the shoes
of the mortgagor.
The scope of properties that fall under PTFA's protection presents an-
other concern about vagueness in the statutory language. PTFA concerns
all "dwellings" and "residential property."46 Generally, local ordinances
and state regulations define dwellings and residential property. However,
if a local ordinance does not specifically state what constitutes a dwelling
and residential property, a court may, on a case-by-case basis, determine
whether a particular property falls within the definition. 47 Because the
definition of dwelling and residential property may be informed by local
ordinances and case-by-case analysis, PTFA's impact may vary depend-
ing on the locality. For example, localities differ on their classifications of
single-room occupancies, rooming houses, boarding houses, and residen-
tial hotels, leading to disparate application of PTFA across jurisdictions.48
Further, PTFA's notice requirements are unclear. While PTFA requires
the successor in interest to give the preexisting tenant "notice to vacate,"
this notice is not defined. What qualifies as sufficient notice may thus come
from one of three sources: (1) federal common law, (2) state mortgage law,
or (3) state landlord and tenant law.
45. Tenants take into account obligations guaranteed by the landlord when they
sign a lease and agree to pay a certain amount of rent; this rent reflects the obliga-
tions the tenants receive.
46. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702)(a).
47. See, e.g., Hill v. Cmty. of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 867 (N.M. 1996)
(To determine whether a group home violated a restrictive covenant against proper-
ties that were not single-family residences, the court conducted a factual inquiry.
Despite the fact that the occupants received medical treatment in the group home,
the court found the group home did constitute a single-family residence because the
occupants lived in the home, shared their meals, and received support from each
other.).
48. Because localities may have varying definitions of dwellings and residential
property PTFA may even have disparate application within a single state.
The first possibility, federal common law as defined by the federal
courts, is unlikely to be the proper source for three reasons. First, PTFA
does not evidence any congressional intent to nationalize the definition of
"notice to vacate." Second, pursuing a definition set by federal courts could
result in clogging the federal court system, which federal judges gener-
ally refrain from doing. Third, a federal common law definition may not
even exist. The second potential source, state mortgage law, is also unlikely
because the type of notice required under such state statutes differs from
notice to vacate. Whereas mortgage statutes prescribe notice a foreclosing
party must give to the defaulting mortgagor, who may or may not live in
the property, notice to vacate from a successor in interest to a preexisting
tenant is more analogous to a landlord/tenant relationship. Therefore, the
sufficiency of "notice to vacate" under PTFA will likely be determined by
examining the third potential source, state landlord/tenant notice require-
ments. Because sufficiency of notice will likely be determined by looking
to landlord/tenant law in each state, the type of notice required to satisfy
PTFA will likely vary by jurisdiction.
It is also unclear whether "provision of notice" means the sending of
notice or if it also includes the receipt of such notice, which would delay
the start of the tenant's 90-day period. State landlord/tenant notice require-
ments will likely govern whether provision of notice requires receipt of
notice by the tenant, and would again vary by jurisdiction.
The third requirement for PTFA's definition of a bona fide lease or ten-
ancy is also vague. The third requirement states that "the lease or tenancy
requires the receipt of rent that is not substantially less than the fair market
rent for the property or the unit's rent is reduced or subsidized. . . ."9 That
this requirement uses both the words "property" and "unit" raises ques-
tions as to whether a preexisting tenant has to pay rent that is fair market
value for his particular unit or for the building as a whole." To impose
the latter interpretation would contravene the purpose of PTFA, which is
to protect tenants, and is therefore highly unlikely. Similarly, the third re-
quirement is vague as to whether the rent must be an amount of money
or if the rental payment may be the performance of a service. Whether the
performance of a service in exchange for a tenant's ability to occupy a prop-
erty satisfies PTFA may impact the rights of certain tenants, such as live-in
housekeepers or nannies.
49. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702(b)(3) (emphasis added).
50. For example, to fall under PTFA's protection, would a tenant in an apartment
building need only to demonstrate that he pays fair market value for his individual
unit or fair market value for any unit in the entire building? The answer to this
question may be significant for successors in interest, who may attempt to evict pre-
existing tenants in multi-family dwellings by asserting that the usage of both words
permits the latter interpretation.
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Further, the third requirement for a bona fide lease or tenancy does not
stipulate how fair market value should be calculated. It is unclear whether
fair market value should be calculated at the time the tenant entered into
the lease or tenancy, at the time of foreclosure, when the successor in inter-
est attempts to vacate the tenant, or at some other time. The answer may
have a great impact on long-term tenants in rent-controlled apartments."
Lastly, the wording of the third requirement is also unclear as to whether
individuals who rent portions of properties, such as basements or bed-
rooms, would fall under PTFA's protection.
C. Issues on Which PTFA is Silent
In addition to raising questions of interpretation, PTFA is silent on sev-
eral issues that may affect the rights of tenants. PTFA does not address
whether a tenant can waive PTFA's protections.52 This silence is significant
because tenants unaware of their rights may unknowingly waive or sell
them to a foreclosing mortgagee or a successor in interest. For example,
a foreclosing mortgagee or a successor in interest may offer the tenant
money to vacate the property. If the tenant is unaware of his rights, he may
accept the money to leave under the false assumption that he could be
evicted once the property is foreclosed. If the rights provided by PTFA are
determined to not be waivable, a successor in interest will not be able to
give a preexisting tenant money in exchange for vacating a property before
90-days or the expiration of the lease period. Other statutory protections,
such as anti-deficiency legislation," cannot be waived." Therefore, PTFA
may be interpreted to give tenants rights that cannot be waived.
While PTFA's definition of a bona fide lease or tenancy describes ele-
ments of the agreement itself, it neglects to set a point in time by which the
tenant and the mortgagor must have entered into the agreement." PTFA
does not state whether the agreement must have been entered into before
the mortgagor defaulted on the mortgage or if agreements made after de-
fault but before foreclosure are eligible for PTFA's protection. Considering
Congress's intent to protect tenants from evictions that result from no fault
of their own, agreements entered into after default should be protected un-
less there is bad faith on the part of the tenant. If a tenant has no knowledge
51. Because of rent control or rent stabilization programs, certain tenants may be
paying rents substantially below current fair market value.
52. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702.
53. Anti-deficiency legislation is legislation that limits the mortgagee's ability to
obtain a deficiency judgment. See REAL ESTATE TRANsFER, FIRNANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 4, at 731.
54. See DeBerard Props., Ltd. v. Lim, 976 P.2d 843 (Cal. 1999) (finding that al-
though the text of California's anti-deficiency statute fails to explicitly prohibit
waiver, rights under the statute are not waivable).
55. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702.
of default and possible foreclosure, then in keeping with the purpose of
PTFA he should receive protection under PTFA. However, if a tenant is
aware of the default and the possibility of foreclosure, then his agreement
may be outside the scope of PTFA's protection.6
PTFA is also silent as to whether a tenant is bound by the terms and
conditions of the lease he signed with the mortgagor.7 PTFA only states
that a successor in interest may not terminate a tenant's right to remain in
the property until the tenant's lease expires or 90-days' notice is given.5 8
Narrow interpretation suggests that the tenant need not comport with his
lease nor pay rent in order to remain in the property. However, Congress's
intent was to protect tenants in good standing from foreclosure. Therefore,
protections afforded to tenants by PTFA likely only exist if tenants comply
with their leases and continue their rental payments. However, because
PTFA is silent on whether a tenant must exercise his statutory protections,
the possibility remains that a tenant may be able to terminate his lease be-
fore it expires and vacate the property before the end of his statutory pos-
sessory period.
PTFA's notice requirements do not specify when a successor in interest
may give notice to a tenant.5 1 PTFA does not state whether a successor in in-
terest must wait to send notice until after the foreclosure sale or if a succes-
sor in interest may provide notice to a tenant after the mortgagor defaults
but before the foreclosure sale occurs.? Thus the interpretation of when
notice may be given could depend on the jurisdiction. In title theory juris-
dictions, the mortgagor has equitable title in a property and the mortgagee
has legal title in the property until the mortgagor makes the final mortgage
payment.1 Upon the final payment, the mortgagor holds both equitable
and legal title to the property, and the mortgagee no longer has an inter-
est in the property.62 In an intermediate theory jurisdiction, the mortgagor
has legal title in the property and the mortgagee has equitable title in the
property until the mortgagor finishes payments on the mortgage, at which
time the mortgagee has no interest in the property.6 However, under the
intermediate theory, once the mortgagor defaults, the mortgagee has legal
56. For example, after a mortgagor defaults on his mortgage, a tenant may insert
himself into a building under a multi-year lease in order to give himself the ability
to bargain with a successor in interest; the tenant could offer to terminate his lease if
the successor in interest pays him a certain amount of money.
57. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702.
58. Id. § 702(a).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. GRAwr S. NELSON & DALE A. WHm~A, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.1 (5th ed.
2007).
62. See id.
63. Id. § 4.3.
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title to the property, subject to the mortgagor's right of equity of redemp-
tion; however, the foreclosure sale extinguishes this right."
Because the mortgagee in both title and intermediate theory jurisdic-
tions has a legal interest in the property when the mortgagor defaults,
a mortgagee may be deemed a successor in interest after the mortgagor
defaults but before the foreclosure sale occurs. If PTFA recognizes legal
interest alone as sufficient, then a mortgagee may send notice to the ten-
ant during the time between the mortgagor's default and the foreclosure
sale, which would significantly shorten the amount of time that the ten-
ant would be able to occupy the property. However, this understanding of
"successor in interest" is unlikely to be recognized by courts interpreting
PTFA, because during this time the mortgagor retains an equitable interest
in the property.65
A mortgagee may also attempt to provide the tenant with notice after
the mortgagor defaults but before the property is sold at a foreclosure sale
by sending "contingent notice." The notice would be contingent upon the
mortgagee being the purchaser at the foreclosure sale; if the mortgagee
were the purchaser, his interest in the property, as a successor in interest,
would relate back to the date he sent the notice to the tenant and again
shorten the tenant's length of notice. While PTFA does not address whether
this type of notice is permissible, it would likely be invalid for two reasons.
First, as discussed above, the mortgagor still has an equitable interest in
the property." Second, if the mortgagee were able to send contingent notice
to tenants, then other third parties would be able to send similar notice.
Confusion and uncertainty could be created for the tenant, which would be
contrary to the intent of PTFA.
The final issue on which PTFA is silent is the types of legal actions PTFA
governs.67 PTFA does not state whether it applies only to mortgage foreclo-
sures or if it also applies to deeds in lieu of foreclosure." Rather than defin-
ing the types of instruments that it governs, PTFA states that it applies to
"any foreclosure" on certain types of property.69 Whether PTFA applies only
to properties that are foreclosed, or if it also encompasses properties that
are transferred to successors in interest by defaulting mortgagors, impacts
the rights of tenants. Under a narrow construction of PTFA, the tenant of a




67. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702.
68. A deed in lieu of foreclosure is when a defaulting mortgagor gives the deed
to the property to the mortgagee to avoid foreclosure of the property by the mort-
gagee and to "satisfy the mortgage debt." NELSON & WHTTMAN, supra note 61, at
§ 6.18.
69. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702(a) (emphasis added).
protection because the transfer does not involve the actual foreclosure of
the property.
Congressional intent, however, may compel the inclusion of deeds in
lieu of foreclosure. Narrowly stated, Congress' intent was to protect ten-
ants from losing their homes at foreclosure. Broadly stated, Congress' in-
tent was to protect tenants from losing their homes when their landlord lost
ownership of the property because of a default. Under the broad construc-
tion of this congressional intent, a deed in lieu of foreclosure may be seen as
a way in which a mortgagor loses his property. Therefore, to protect tenants
whose landlords lose their properties, deeds in lieu of foreclosure should
be included in PTFA's protection.
A narrow construction of either PTFA or Congress's intent would re-
sult in PTFA's application only to properties that are foreclosed, and not
to properties transferred by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. This construction
may create undesirable results; mortgagees may be willing to pay mortgag-
ors to transfer the property through a deed in lieu of foreclosure in order to
avoid triggering tenant protections under PTFA. 0
However, potentially undesirable results are likely avoided by the fact
that a deed in lieu of foreclosure may be likened to the sale of real estate. In
a sale of real estate, the purchaser takes the property subject to any exist-
ing interests in the property." A deed in lieu of foreclosure is akin to a sale
because the deed is given to "satisfy the mortgage debt."72 Thus, a deed in
lieu of foreclosure is effectively a sale of the property in exchange for satis-
faction of the outstanding balance of the mortgage. Therefore, if a deed in
lieu of foreclosure is a sale, then a successor in interest in a property that
has a preexisting tenant will take the property subject to the tenant's inter-
est. Thus, even if the transfer of a property by a deed in lieu of foreclosure
circumvents tenants' rights under PTFA, the tenant may still remain in the
property for the duration of his lease.73
While PTFA creates rights for tenants at foreclosure, the issues on which
PTFA is silent and vagueness within PTFA may lead to litigation as tenants
invoke these rights. Through litigation, courts will interpret the scope of
PTFA. However, courts in different jurisdictions may vary in their inter-
70. This construction would preclude PTFA from applying to Fannie Mae's Deed
for Lease program, under which the defaulting mortgagor deeds the subject property
to the mortgagee and then leases the property from the mortgagee. Under the Deed
for Lease Program, the property is not foreclosed. Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie
Mae Announces Deed for Lease Program (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.
fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2009/4844.jhtml?p = Media&s =News +Releases&
searchid=.
71. REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 448-55.
72. NELSON & WarrMAN, supra note 61, § 6.18.
73. Nonetheless, PTFA offers greater protection, because it gives tenants without
tenancy for a term of years to remain in the property for at least 90 days.
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pretation of PTFA's protections, particularly with issues of lease covenants
by which preexisting tenants and successors in interest are bound, what
type of notice is sufficient under PTFA, and when to calculate fair mar-
ket value. Without clarification from Congress or the Supreme Court, the
impact of PTFA will likely vary as different jurisdictions reach different
interpretations.
III. The Impact of PTFA on State Law
The impact of PTFA on state law depends on whether or not it preempts
state law in a given jurisdiction. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion states that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . .. shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land ... ."" Thus, when there is a conflict between federal law and state
law, federal law preempts the state law. Federal law preempts state law in
two situations.75 The first is when the federal law expressly preempts state
law.76 In this situation, the text of the federal law explicitly states that it pre-
empts state law." The second situation occurs when federal law implicitly
preempts state law!8 The Court recognizes field preemption, where the fed-
eral law is so broad that Congress cannot be seen to have left any room for
states to further develop law in this area, and conflict preemption, where it
is either impossible to comply with both the federal and state laws, or the
state law interferes with Congress's intentions in enacting the federal law."
In any preemption situation, the test for conflict between federal and state
law involves an examination of the federal law's "structure or purpose."'
Even when a federal law purports to expressly preempt state law, the
scope of the preemption may be unclear; in such situations, a court must
look to Congressional intent.81 Absent clear congressional intent, courts
refuse to find that federal law preempts state law.82 In Bates v. Dow Agro-
sciences LLC,8 farmers brought a claim against a pesticide manufacturer,
alleging that the use of the manufacturer's pesticide damaged the farmers'
crops."I The manufacturer claimed the suit was expressly preempted by a
federal law that provided that states "shall not impose or continue in effect
any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition or different from
74. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.






81. Id. at 96.
82. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
83. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
84. Id. at 434-35.
those required under this subchapter."5 In holding that the farmers' claim
was not expressly preempted, the Court found that the federal law pro-
vided for the preemption only of those *state law packaging requirements
that are "in addition to or different" from those outlined in the federal law,
and did not preempt state laws that are consistent with the federal law.
6
Similarly, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,17 the Court analyzed the scope
of the express preemption clause in the Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA)."
In looking to the text of FBSA as well as congressional intent surrounding
its enactment, the Court determined that minimum boating safety require-
ments should be seen as the ultimate objective of the legislation and thus
states have the ability to enact laws that provide higher safety standards. 9
Bates and Sprietsma demonstrate that the scope of express preemption
clauses is informed by congressional intent, and that such preemption is
narrowly construed so that federal laws function as a floor and not a ceil-
ing; states may enact laws that are broader than the federal law as long as
the state law is consistent with the federal law.
Like the federal laws at issue in Bates and Sprietsma, PTFA preempts
state law, stating that "nothing under this section shall affect the require-
ments for termination ... of any State or local law that provides longer time
periods or other additional protections for tenants." 0 Clearly from this text,
as well as congressional intent, PTFA aims to give tenants the greatest pro-
tection possible, and represents only the minimum amount of protection
provided to tenants at foreclosure. Thus, like the interpretation of the stat-
utes in Bates and Sprietsma, any state or local law that is consistent with the
language and intent of PTFA will not be preempted by PTFA.
If state law addressing tenants' rights at foreclosure affords tenants
greater protections than PTFA, PTFA will not preempt state law. The en-
tirety of a state's laws regarding tenants at foreclosure may provide greater
protection to such tenants than PTFA. It is also possible that certain ele-
ments of the state's laws, combined with elements of PTFA, may together
provide the greatest protection to tenants at foreclosure. PTFA's text sug-
gests that either scenario would be consistent with, and therefore permis-
sible under, PTFA.
If, however, state law does not protect a tenant's interest from being ex-
tinguished by foreclosure, then PTFA will preempt state law. To determine
if state law offers greater protection to tenants at foreclosure than PTFA,
it is necessary to examine the rights of tenants at foreclosure in each state.
85. Id. at 435-36.
86. Id. at 447.
87. 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
88. Id. at 54.
89. See id. at 70.
90. PTFA, supra note 20, § 702(a).
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The analysis of state law begins with examining the state's foreclosure pro-
cedure to determine what rights and what role tenants have in the process.
When PTFA preempts state law regarding tenants' rights at foreclosure,
notice requirements under the state's landlord and tenant law must also be
analyzed to determine the type of notice required in order to comply with
PTFA.9' The following analysis examines state law in six jurisdictions, Ari-
zona, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington, D.C.
A. Arizona
The most common foreclosure procedure in Arizona is power of sale
foreclosure on a deed of trust.92 A trustee93 may foreclose a deed of trust by
power of sale "after a breach or default in performance of the contract or
contracts, for which the trust property is conveyed as security, or a breach
or default of the trust deed."94 However, the power of sale may not be ex-
ercised "before the ninety-first day after the date of the recording of the
notice of the sale." 95
When a trustee forecloses pursuant to a deed of trust, the trustee must:
record a notice of sale "in the office of the recorder of each county where
the trust property is situated"; send by certified or registered mail a copy
of the notice to the parties to the deed of trust that includes the recording
date; post a copy of the notice on the property to be sold at foreclosure
sale at least 20 days before the sale and in a conspicuous location on the
property, if this can be achieved without a breach of the peace; post the
notice on a superior court building in the jurisdiction in which the property
is located; and publish the notice "in a newspaper of general circulation
in each county in which the trust property to be sold is situated." 96 Such
publication must occur "at least once a week for four consecutive weeks,"
with the last day of publication not less than ten days before the date of the
foreclosure sale.97
In addition to these notice requirements, the foreclosing trustee must
also send a copy of the notice of sale to any person who requests a copy
and records such request in the county recording office.98 Arizona law does
91. When PTFA does not preempt state law, PTFA, and its notice requirements,
are not
92. JOHN RAo, TARA TWOMEY & ODETTE WILLIAMSON, FORECLOSURES § 14.8 (2d ed.
2007). See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 61, at § 1.6 ("In many states the deed of
trust represents the most commonly used mortgage instrument.").
93. "'Trustee' means an individual, association or corporation qualified ... or
the successor in interest thereto, to whom trust property is conveyed by trust deed."
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-801 (2010).
94. Id. § 33-807 (A).
95. Id. § 33-807 (D).
96. Id. §§ 33-808, 33-809.
97. Id. § 33-808 (A) (4).
98. Id. § 33-809 (A) (B).
not require that notice of a trustee's sale specify the rights of any parties,
including the trustee, the trustor, or any tenants in actual possession of the
property.9 After proper notice of the sale, the trustee may sell the foreclosed
property at a public auction. 1o
Under state law, Arizona tenants do not have the right to remain in the
property once it has been foreclosed; foreclosure operates to evict tenants
from the property.'01 Therefore, if the tenant can establish that he has a bona
fide lease or tenancy, PTFA will preempt state foreclosure procedure, giv-
ing the tenant the ability to remain in possession of the property for the
remainder of his lease or for at least 90 days.
To comply with PTFA's notice requirements, a successor in interest will
likely be held to notice requirements outlined in Arizona's landlord and
tenant law. This law provides, "a person 'notifies' or 'gives' a notice or no-
tification to another by taking steps reasonably calculated to inform the
other in ordinary course whether or not the other actually comes to know
of it."102 A tenant receives notice when "it is delivered in hand to the ten-
ant or mailed by registered or certified mail to him at the place held out
by him as the place for receipt of the communication or, in the absence of
such designation, to his last known place of residence."' 03 If notice is sent
by registered or certified mail, however, then "the tenant ... is deemed to
have received such notice on the date the notice is actually received by him
or five days after the date the notice is mailed, whichever occurs first."10
In applying Arizona law, whether a successor in interest complies with
the notice requirement under PTFA will depend on whether the 90-day
period begins when the landlord gives notice or when the tenant receives
notice. If provision of notice under PTFA is interpreted only to require that
the successor in interest "give" notice, then under Arizona law, a successor
in interest is required only to take reasonably calculated steps to notify a
tenant to vacate the property. This interpretation of notice includes actual
and constructive notice. If, however, the provision of notice under PTFA is
interpreted to include receipt of notice by the tenant, then the tenant must
have actual notice to vacate or the successor in interest must send notice by
registered or certified mail.
B. Georgia
In Georgia, the most common method of foreclosure is also power of
sale.0" However, a mortgagee may foreclose by power of sale only if the
.99. Id. § 33-808 (D).
100. Id. § 33-810.
101. Bennett v. U.S. Land, Title & Legacy Co., 141 P. 717, 721 (Ariz. 1914).
102. Aluz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1313(B).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. FoRECLOSURES, supra note 92, at Appendix C.
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mortgage, security deed or lien contract provides for it.'0 In a power of
sale proceeding, "all that is required of the foreclosing party is to advertise
and sell the property according to the terms of the instrument, and that
sale be conducted in good faith."'" In addition to notice by publication,
the foreclosing party must provide "notice of the initiation of proceedings
to exercise a power of sale . .. no later than 30 days before the date of the
proposed foreclosure"; this notice must be in writing and sent by registered
or certified mail to the debtor.08 Once the foreclosing party complies with
notice requirements, it can hold a sale of the foreclosed property to the
highest bidder. If the foreclosure sale does not raise enough money to cover
the debt secured, then the foreclosing party must obtain judicial confirma-
tion of the sale.'" Foreclosure results in termination of all junior interests
in the property."0
Under current Georgia law, a successor in interest legally may remove
a tenant from the property after a foreclosure. A tenant who remains in
a property after a foreclosure terminates his interest in the property is a
tenant at sufferance, and does not have the legal right to occupy the prem-
ises."' Because such a tenant is a tenant at sufferance, the successor in inter-
est need only make a demand for possession in order to remove the tenant
from the property.'12
As with Arizona, PTFA also preempts Georgia law. Under Georgia law,
preexisting tenants become tenants at sufferance after the property is fore-
closed, with no rights or interest in the property. Thus, if a preexisting ten-
ant has a bona fide lease or tenancy, then he will fall under the protection
of PTFA and will be able to remain in the property in accordance with the
terms of PTFA.
Under Georgia law, a successor in interest may provide a wide variety
of notice to a tenant in order to comport with the notice requirements
under PTFA, because Georgia law does not require a landlord to pro-
vide a particular type of notice to a tenant in order to vacate the tenant
from the property."' Instead, notice "is sufficient if such notice gets to the
106. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-14-161-44-14-162 (West 2010).
107. Little v. Fleet Fin., 481 S.E.2d 552, 556 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Kennedy v.
Gwinnet Commercial Bank, 270 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)).
108. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.2.
109. Id. § 44-14-161; see also Walton Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ross, 736 F.2d 1449 (11th
Cir. 1984) (Under Georgia law, the sole purpose of judicial confirmation of foreclo-
sure sale under a security instrument "is to determine that the sale of real estate
was property advertised and conducted and that the land brought its true market
value.").
110. Partin v. S. Discount Co., 307 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
111. Id. at 875-76.
112. Id. at 876.
113. Burns v. Reves, 457 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Godfrey v.
Walker, 42 Ga. 562 (1871)).
tenant." 114 Such notice need not be in writing."'s Therefore, in applying
Georgia notice requirements to PTFA, a successor in interest in Georgia
will be in compliance with PTFA so long as notice to vacate gets to the
tenant."'
C. Illinois
The Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law governs foreclosure procedure
in Illinois."' In Illinois, a mortgagee may terminate a mortgage through
a deed in lieu of foreclosure," consent foreclosure, 119 common law strict
foreclosure, 120 or judicial foreclosure, which is the most common method.121
Illinois law expressly forbids mortgagees to foreclose by power of sale. 122
To initiate a judicial foreclosure procedure, the mortgagee must join the
necessary parties to the action.12 Necessary parties include the mortgagor
and "other persons (but not guarantors) who owe payment of indebted-
ness or the performance of other obligations secured by the mortgage and
against whom personal liability is asserted."124 Permissible parties may also
be joined, and include "[aill persons having a possessory interest in the
mortgaged real estate." 125 After the foreclosure complaint is filed, a trial is
held to determine whether the mortgage will be foreclosed. 26 If the judge
114. Id.
115. Farlow v. Cent. Oil Co., 39 S.E.2d 561, 561-62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (holding
that notice from the landlord's attorney to the tenant's attorney was sufficient under
Georgia law, even if it was not in writing).
116. Burns, 457 S.E.2d at 181 (whether notice gets to a tenant may be adduced by
the facts of the situation).
117. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1101-5/15-1107 (West 2010).
118. Id. at 5/15-1401 ("Any mortgagee or mortgagee's nominee may accept a
deed from the mortgagor in lieu of foreclosure subject to any other claims or liens
affecting the real estate.").
119. Id. at 5/15-1402 ("[T]he court shall enter a judgment satisfying the mortgage
indebtedness by vesting absolute title to the mortgaged real estate in the mortgagee
free and clear of all claims, liens ... and interest of the mortgagor, including all rights
of reinstatement and redemption, and of all rights of all other persons made parties
in the foreclosure whose interests are subordinate to that of the mortgagee.").
120. Id. at 5/15-1403.
121. Id. at 5/15-1404 ("Except as provided ... the interest in the mortgaged real
estate of (i) all persons made a party in such a foreclosure and (ii) all nonrecord
claimants given notice ... shall be terminated by the judicial sale of the real estate,
pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure."); see also FORECLOSURES, supra note 92, at
Appendix C.
122. 735 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1405 ("No real estate within this State may be
sold by virtue of any power of sale contained in a mortgage or any other agreement.").
123. Id. at 5/15-1501(a).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 5/15-1501(b)(1).
126. Id. at 5/15-1504, 5/15-1506.
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enters a judgment of foreclosure, "the real estate which is the subject of the
judgment shall be sold at a judicial sale," 127 and after the sale, an order to
confirm the sale is to be entered. 128
The entry of a foreclosure judgment can "cut off only rights or claims
of interest subsequent to the interest asserted," but can only bind the junior
mortgagee if he is made a party to the proceeding. 129 However, Illinois law
further states:
A lease of all or any part of the mortgaged real estate shall not be terminated
automatically solely by virtue of the entry into possession by (i) a mortgagee
or receiver prior to the entry of an order confirming the sale, (ii) the holder
of the certificate of sale, (ii) the holder of the deed issued pursuant to that
certificate, or (iv) if no certificate or deed was issued, the purchaser at the
sale.130
Thus, a foreclosure does not extinguish a leasehold interest in a property.131
Because a foreclosure sale does not automatically terminate a leasehold
in the foreclosed property," 2 the type of notice that a tenant is entitled to
received from a successor in interest depends on whether the mortgagee
makes the tenant a party to the foreclosure. 133 If a tenant is not person-
ally served in the foreclosure action, a mortgagee or purchaser may file a
supplemental petition13 followed by an order of possession, although a
tenant may retain possession for the lesser of 120 days or the remainder of
his lease, but at least 30 days.135
A mortgagee in possession or a purchaser may file a supplemental peti-
tion for possession of the property subject to foreclosure "at any time dur-
ing the pendency of the foreclosure and up to 90 days after the date of the
order confirming the sale." 136 A supplemental petition may only be filed
against "a person not personally named as a party to the foreclosure." 137
127. Id. at 5/15-1507.
128. Id. at 5/15-1508(f).
129. Heritage Fed. Credit Union v. Giampa, 622 N.E.2d 48, 49 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Baldi v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 446 N.E.2d 1205, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
("[A] foreclosure proceeding to which a junior mortgagee is not a party is not bind-
ing on him, and he retains his right to redeem in equity.").
130. 735 ILL. REV. CODE ANN. § 5/15-1701(e) (emphasis added).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 5/15-1501 (A tenant is not a necessary party to a foreclosure action).
134. Id. at 5/15-1701(h)(1) ("[Tihe mortgagee ... or the purchaser may ... file
a supplemental petition for possession against a person not personally named as a
party to the foreclosure.").
135. Id. at 5/15-1701(h)(4).
136. Id. at 5/15-1701(h)(1).
137. Id.
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Thus, if the tenant is not personally served with notice of the foreclosure
action, then a successor in interest may file a supplemental petition against
the tenant. The hearing on the supplemental petition must occur "no less
than 21 days from the date of service of the notice." 38
If the supplemental petition is successful, and the tenant against whom
the petition was filed is current in his rent or has made a good faith effort to
remain current in his rent, then the order granting possession may not take
effect for either "120 days following the notice of the hearing on the supple-
mental petition" or "through the duration of his or her lease," whichever
is shorter, although the tenant must get at least 30 days.139 However, the
ability of the tenant to remain in the foreclosed property for the 120 days or
duration of his mortgage terminates if the tenant fails to continue making
rental payments in full or fails to make a good faith effort to do so.140
A mortgagee in possession or the purchaser at a foreclosure sale may
also remove an occupant from the property subject to foreclosure by fil-
ing a forcible entry and detainer action against the tenant in possession.141
However, such action is only available if tenant is not a party to the foreclo-
surel 42 and, if a supplemental petition has not been filed, must be 90 days
after a notice of intent to file has been properly served on the tenant.143
Under a forcible entry and detainer action, the mortgagee or purchaser
may not terminate a periodic tenancy, because it expires under its own
terms. To terminate a year-to-year tenancy, the mortgagee or purchaser
must provide the holdover tenant with written notice 60 days before the
end of year.'" To terminate a week-to-week tenancy, a mortgagee or pur-
chaser must give the holdover tenant "7 days' notice, in writing." 4' For all
other cases of tenancy for any term that is less than one year, the mortgagee
or purchaser "may terminate the tenancy [of the holdover tenant] by 30
days'-notice, in writing."146 Unlike other tenancies, tenants at will are not
entitled to notice. 4 7
At no point does the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act define what it
means to be a tenant or an occupant.148 Moreover, the section establishing
138. Id. at 5/15-1701(h)(2).
139. Id. at 5/15-1701(h)(4).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5/15-1701(h)(1).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 5/9-205.
145. Id. at 5/9-207.
146. Id.
147. Cross v. Campell, 89 B1. App. 489,489 (2nd Dist. 1900) (Under a "tenancy at
will .. . [tenants are] not entitled to a notice to quit, a mere demand being all that the
law requires under such circumstances.").
148. 735 ILL. REV. CODE ANN. 5/15-1101 et seq.
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the successors in interest rights to possession uses the words "tenant" and
"occupant" in a way that suggests they are interchangeable. 149 Other acts
in the Illinois code, in contrast, do define what it means to be a "tenant"
for the purpose of each act.s0 Because these other acts define "tenant" in a
way specific to each act, those definitions have no bearing on the Illinois
Mortgage Foreclosure Act's use of the word tenant. Therefore, it is unclear
which persons fall into the category of "tenant" or "occupant," and thus
receive protection under Illinois law.
The meaning of "tenant" under Illinois law must be further analyzed
to understand the impact of PTFA. The scope of the definition of tenant,
as understood by Illinois law, as compared to the definition of bona fide
lease or tenancy under PTFA, determines whether PTFA preempts Illinois
law. If the Illinois definition is narrower than PTFA's definition, then PTFA
will have a great impact in Illinois. Conversely, if the Illinois definition is
broader than PTFA's definition, PTFA will have a minimal impact in Illinois.
Illinois law provides greater protection to tenants without leases than
PTFA does in most situations. If a successor in interest files a supplemental
petition, any order to remove a tenant from the foreclosed property may
allow the tenant to remain in possession of the property for up to 120 days,
which would be greater than the 90 days granted by PTFA. However, in
order to be eligible for this protection under Illinois law, a tenant must make
a good faith effort to continue to pay his rent, a condition not imposed by
PTFA.15 Further, if a successor in interest does not file a supplemental peti-
tion, then a tenant may remain in the possession of the property for at least
90 days after the notice of intention to file. For example, if a holdover tenant
has a month-to-month tenancy, a successor in interest must notify the ten-
ant of his intent to file a forcible entry and detainer action. After 90 days,
the successor in interest may file a forcible entry and detainer action, which
for a month-to-month would give a tenant a 30-day notice to vacate, for a
total of 120 days.
In only some situations, however, does Illinois law afford greater protec-
tion to tenants with bona fide leases or tenancies than does PTFA. If a suc-
cessor in interest files a supplemental petition, which is only available when
the tenant is not a party to the foreclosure, then a tenancy is terminated in
120 days or at the end of the lease, whichever is shorter. Conversely, PTFA
states that a tenant may remain in the foreclosed property until his lease
149. See id. 5/15-1701.
150. As used in the Rental Property Utility Service Act, "tenant includes occu-
pants of a building or mobile home, whether under a lease or periodic tenancy." ILL.
REv. CODE ANN. 735/1.1. See also id. at 745/3 (Under the Mobile-Home Landlord and
Tenant Rights Act, a "tenant means any person who occupies a mobile home rental
unit for dwelling purposes or a lot on which he parks a mobile home for an agreed
upon consideration.")).
151. See infra n. 57-58 and accompanying text.
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expires. Therefore, if tenant has a lease with more than 120 days remaining,
then he will receive greater protection under PTFA than under Illinois law.
D. Ohio
In Ohio, the most common method of foreclosure is a judicial proceed-
ing.5 2 In order to foreclose a debt secured by a mortgage, the mortgagee
must obtain a court order from the county in which the subject property is
located.'5 3 The mortgagee must then join the necessary parties to the fore-
closure proceeding" For matters of jurisdiction, necessary parties include
any holder of a right or interest in the subject property that took interest
subsequent to the mortgage being foreclosed.' Generally, if such a party is
not joined to the foreclosure action, the foreclosure does not extinguish that
party's right in the property and any subsequent party takes the property
subject to that party's surviving right."6
However, the Ohio Recording Act modifies these general rules."' Ohio's
Recording Act ig a race-notice type of recording statute; it provides that
instruments of writing properly executed for the conveyance of encum-
brance of lands, tenements . .. shall be recorded ... [and ujntil so recorded
or filed for record, they are fraudulent insofar as they relate to a subsequent
bona fide purchaser having, at the time of purchase, no knowledge of the
existence of that former deed, land contract, or instrument."1 8
The recording act modifies the general rules because if a successor in in-
terest in the property is bona fide purchaser for value,15 ' then he takes the
property free of the unrecorded junior lien.'*
In Ohio, the transfer of property at a judicial foreclosure sale to a suc-
cessor in interest terminates an existing leasehold estate if the lease is
"subsequent and subordinate to the mortgage."'' In Simplex, a mortgagee
foreclosed on a property that was occupied by a tenant without joining the
tenant to the foreclosure action.6 2 The court found that, despite the fact the
152. FORECLOSURES, supra note 92, at Appendix C.
153. Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.07 (West 2010).
154. Hembree v. Mid-America Fed. Say. & Loan Assc., 580 N.E.2d 1103, 1108
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see also Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.25(A).
158. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.25(A).
159. A bona fide purchaser for value is someone who pays value for real estate
and lacks notice of prior, unrecorded conveyances. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (8th
ed. 2004).
160. Hembree, 580 N.E.2d at 1108.
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tenant was not joined in the action, his interest in the property was termi-
nated by the foreclosure because his lease was executed subsequent to the
mortgage.'" The court reasoned that the rights of the tenant are directly
tied to those of the mortgagor.'6 Therefore, if the mortgagor's interest is
extinguished by a foreclosure, then the tenant's interest is necessarily ex-
tinguished as well.16s
Based on the Simplex holding, the Ohio Court of Appeals in Hembree
found that a tenant's interest in a property is terminated by foreclo-
sure, even if the tenant is not joined to the foreclosure proceeding.166 In
Hembree, a mortgagee pursued a foreclosure action without joining the
tenant who was occupying the subject property. 67 The mortgagee then
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.'6 The tenant claimed that
because his occupation of the property was "open and notorious," the
interest of any party who purchased the property at the foreclosure sale
would be subject to the rights of the tenant.169 The court, however, found
that "[r]egardless of the form of notice or the equities, if the underly-
ing right of the tenant is cut off at foreclosure, failure to join is of no
consequence." 70 Ohio law thus gives no rights to preexisting tenancies,
regardless of whether or not they are joined to the foreclosure action.17
1
Because of this low standard, PTFA preempts Ohio law. If a preexisting
tenant can establish that he is a bona fide tenant under PTFA, he will
therefore be able to remain in the foreclosed property after the culmina-
tion of the foreclosure action.
A successor in interest also likely need to comply with Ohio notice
requirements in order to satisfy PTFA's notice requirements. Ohio law
requires that a landlord terminate a tenancy through "notice given" to
the tenant.172 Notice to tenants must be unequivocal, which may be in-
ferred by circumstance.' 7' However, while notice must be unequivocal,
no further requirements are provided for notice to be valid.174 Therefore,
whether a successor in interest provides proper notice to a preexisting
tenant that comports with PTFA will likely be determined on a case-by-
case basis.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 587.
165. Id.
166. Hembree, 580 N.E.2d at 1109-10.
167. Id. at 1105.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1109.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.17.
173. Reith v. Skruck, 653 N.E.2d 755, 756 (Ohio Mun. 1995).
174. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.17.
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E. Virginia
In Virginia, the most common method of foreclosure is by power of
sale." If the grantor of a deed of trust defaults in the payment of the debt
secured by the deed, then the grantee may exercise foreclosure by power
of sale to cure the debt.176 Before the foreclosure sale may take place, the
trustee or the party secured by the deed of trust is required to give written
notice of the sale.1' The written notice of the sale, containing the date, time
and place of the sale, must go to: (1) the present owner of the property,
(ii) any subordinate lienholder, (iii) any assignee of a note secured by the
property, (iv) any condominium unit owners' association that has filed a
lien on the property, (v) any property owners' association that has filed a
lien on the property, and (vi) any proprietary lessee's association that has
filed a lien.17s This written notice must be delivered by personal delivery
or by certified, registered mail to the owner "no less than 14 days prior to
such sale." 179 In contrast, the notice given to the remaining parties may be
delivered by personal delivery or ordinary mail.18s
In addition to the written notice, the grantee must advertise the foreclo-
sure sale in a "newspaper having a general circulation in the city or county
wherein the property to be sold, or any portion thereof, lies.""s1 The deed of
trust itself may specify the number of times the notice must be published.182
If it does not do so, then the grantee must advertise the foreclosure sale
once a week for four successive weeks.'"
Virginia requires that a landlord provide notice to its tenant(s) in the
event of a default on the mortgage, an acceleration of the mortgage, or
when the mortgagor receives notice of the foreclosure sale from the mort-
gagee.1" However, the requirement does not apply "to any managing agent
who does not receive a copy of such written notice from the lender."8 5 The
175. FORECLOSURES, supra note 92, at Appendix C.
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59(7) (West 2010) ("[T]he trustee shall forthwith de-
clare all the debts and obligations secured by the deed of trust at once due and
payable and may take possession of the property and proceed to sell the same at
auction...").




181. Id. § 55-59.2; see also id. § 55-59.3 (The advertisement must contain, in addi-
tion to anything mandated by the deed of trust, a description of the property, the
general location, the time, place and terms of the sale, and the name(s) and contact
information of the trustee(s).).
182. Id. § 55-59.2(1).
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requirement is also inapplicable when the tenant receives a written copy of
the notice of the foreclosure sale.'" Once a foreclosure occurs, it terminates
junior interests in the foreclosed property.18 7
While a defaulting landlord must give a tenant notice of his default,
this notice does nothing to protect the tenant's possessory interest in the
property.'8 Because tenants in Virginia have no rights in a property after
it is foreclosed, they are subject to protection under PTFA so long as they
can establish that their lease or tenancy is bona fide. PTFA thus preempts
Virginia law.
While PTFA preempts Virginia law regarding tenants' rights at fore-
closure, Virginia law governs the type of notice that must be given under
PTFA by a successor in interest to a preexisting tenant. Under Virginia law,
notice "means notice given in writing by either regular mail or hand deliv-
ery, with the sender retaining sufficient proof of having given such notice,
which may be either a United States postal certificate of mailing or a cer-
tificate of service confirming such mailing prepared by the sender.""s' The
law further states that "a person shall be deemed to have notice of a fact if
he has actual knowledge of it, he has received verbal notice of it, or from
all of the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question, he
has reason to know it exists." 90 Finally, "[a] person 'notifies' or 'gives' a
notice or notification to another by taking steps reasonably calculated to
inform another person whether or not the other person actually comes to
know of it."91 When such notice is not in writing, then the party giving the
notice bears the "burden of proof to show that the notice was given to the
recipient of the notice." 192 Applying this Virginia notice law to PTFA would
require successors in interest to either give preexisting tenants notice to
vacate in writing, either by hand delivery or by mail, or demonstrate that
steps taken were reasonably calculated to give a tenant notice to vacate,
which could vary on a case-by-case basis.
F. Washington, D.C.
In Washington, D.C., the most common method of foreclosure is power
of sale.193 When a mortgagor defaults on a mortgage, a mortgagee may fore-
close by power of sale only if there is a power of sale provision contained in
186. Id.
187. Nelson White Constr. Mgmt. Corp v. McConaghy, 15 B.R. 480, 481 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1981).
188. Id. § 55-225.10.




193. FORECLoSuREs, supra note 92, at Appendix C.
the deed of trust, mortgage, or security instrument between the mortgagee
and the mortgagor.9 4 The foreclosure provisions of the D.C. Code require
the mortgagee to notify the mortgagor of the impending foreclosure sale
by written notice "by certified mail return receipt requested of said sale to
the owner of the real property encumbered by said deed of trust, mortgage,
or security instrument at his last known address . . . at least 30 days in ad-
vance of the date" of the foreclosure sale.195 In addition to sending written
notice to the mortgagor, the mortgagee must also send a copy of the writ-
ten notice to the mayor of D.C.; the 30-day period is then measured by the
mayor's date of receipt, as is given in an acknowledgement to the holder.96
After proper notice, the foreclosed property may be sold at a foreclosure
sale."'9 Washington, D.C. foreclosure law does not require the mortgagee to
provide notice of the foreclosure sale to other lienholders, whether senior
or junior.198
Washington, D.C. case law specifically addresses the issue of tenants'
rights in the event of a foreclosure sale.'" In Valentine, the mortgagee pur-
chased a four-unit rental building at a foreclosure sale, after the borrower
defaulted on his mortgage payments, and subsequently conveyed the
building to the Veterans Administration (VA).2" Valentine was a tenant in
the building who, after the initial one-year term of her lease expired, had
remained in her unit as a tenant-at-will. 201 After it obtained the property,
the VA sent Valentine a 30-day notice to vacate the property.2 02 Valentine
failed to vacate, prompting the VA to file for possession of the property.203
The D.C. Court of Appeals held that a party who comes into ownership
of a property as a result of a mortgage default has the same relationship
with the remaining tenants as would any other owner.204 Foreclosure does
not extinguish a tenant's leasehold, even if it is a tenancy-at-will.2 05 Under
Washington, D.C. law, purchasers at foreclosure sales thus obtain property
194. See D.C. CODE § 42-815(b) (2010).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 42-816.
198. Pappas v. E. Say. Bank, FSB, 911 A.2d 1230, 1238-39 (D.C. 2006). The Court
found that D.C. Code § 42-815 only requires the mortgagee to send notice to the
"owner" of the property, and not to any lienholders. The Court also declined to find
that equity principles obligate a mortgagee to send notice of a foreclosure sale to
other lienholders.
199. Adm'r of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine. 490 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 1985).




204. Id. at 1170.
205. Id.
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subject to the rights of existing tenants in the property, and may only evict
such tenants for specific, enumerated causes.2 06
As Valentine illustrates, a tenant with a lease for a term of years may
remain in his unit as a tenant-at-will after the expiration of the stated term
of the lease, provided that he continues to pay his rent and does not violate
the lease. 207 Valentine specifically states that a landlord may not evict a ten-
ant unless he has good cause, even after the period of the lease expires.
The definition of a legitimate tenancy in Washington, D.C. is clearly much
broader than the definition under PTFA and thus provides greater protec-
tion to tenants than PTFA.
Because successors in interest of foreclosed property in Washington,
D.C. take the property subject to the rights of pre-existing tenants, and be-
cause no tenant (not even a tenant-at-will) may be evicted but for a reason
listed under the law, tenants in Washington, D.C. enjoy greater protections
at foreclosure than PTFA provides. Therefore, PTFA does not preempt
Washington, D.C. law.
III. Conclusion
While PTFA requires further clarification, and is silent on certain issues,
it does provide rights for tenants at foreclosure where previously none ex-
isted. PTFA creates a foundation of rights that may be combined with exist-
ing rights under state law in order to maximize the protection for tenants
at foreclosure. As evidenced by analysis of state law, however, many states
do not provide any protection for tenants in the event of foreclosure of their
properties. In these circumstances, PTFA is not just a foundation; it is the
only source of rights for tenants at foreclosure. Therefore, PTFA protects
many tenants who otherwise would have no recourse during a foreclosure
and ultimately helps to solve one of the "often overlooked problems" of the
foreclosure crisis.
206. Id. at 1167.
207. Id.
